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4 In  the context  of  the neoliberal  university  and the marketisation of  education,  the
assignment  is  a  means  of  measuring  progress,  monitoring  productivity,  and
maintaining  the  institutional  hierarchies  that  govern  educational  settings.  The
assignment  also  ensures  that  student  and  teacher  are  put  to  work,  that  they
understand learning and study as part of a sphere of economic exchange in which a set
of  abstractions  mediate  the  relationships  that  together  constitute  society.  The
assignment  demarcates  the  space  of  correct  and  proper  knowledge  acquisition,  a
classroom predicated on a logic of ownership and mastery. It is not at all surprising
then that throughout Fred Moten’s Stolen Life, the second monograph in the trilogy, the
classroom is treated with a sense of ambivalence and, at times, trepidation. When, five
pages into a chapter entitled “In The Touring Machine (Flesh Thought Inside Out),”
Moten turns towards a more introspective and poetic register it is the demand of the
classroom that pulls him back from the experience of familial, communal study. The
improvisational wordplay of childhood gives way to “real school” (171) where students
are “sitting around a table” (171) in a ritual of rehearsed professionalism. Moten writes
about being “suspended in the break of computation” (171) while reading Zong! as a
collective “we,” but the classroom produces no such paths towards errant thought. Yet,
it  is  within the confines of  the educational  institution that  Moten comes closest  to
articulating a political directive to his reader. Written in the style of the syllabus, the
chapter “Anassignment Letters” is both a critique of the prevailing conditions of study
and  an  attempt  to  find  cracks  in  their  bureaucratic  façade.  The  careful  tracing  of
smooth concrete for evidence of rupture is  the political  and aesthetic practice that
stands as the focus of Stolen Life. There are no ends, just an endless pursuit. As Moten
puts it: “this is not about the achievement of freedom” but “about the escape” (240). 
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5 Like  Black  and  Blur,  the first  monograph  in  Moten’s  trilogy,  Stolen  Life is  firmly
positioned within the black radical tradition though a notable difference between the
two volumes is that Moten speaks more directly to the field of political theory in the
latter.  While  artists,  writers,  and  musicians  remain  central  co-theorists  for  Moten,
figures like Charles Mingus, Ed Roberson, and Ralph Ellison are also joined by a set of
thinkers whose own archives of  black radical  thought are more closely intertwined
with explicitly philosophical and sociological traditions. Moten frequently returns to
the writings of Nahum Chandler and, by extension, those of Chandler’s most consistent
interlocutor W.E.B. Du Bois. In the company of Moten, Chandler, Kevin Gaines, C.L.R.
James, and Amiri Baraka, Du Bois becomes a chronicler of Black freedom whose at times
distant  and  scientific  tone  betrays  an  appreciation  of  and  desire  for  what  Saidiya
Hartman has elsewhere called the beautiful experiments of Black social life. Moten’s
rotating set of metaphors in his writing on Du Bois fits both object and argumentation;
in “Uplift and Criminality” Du Bois’  latent fascination with insurgency is “a kind of
whistle”  that  Moten  categorizes  “under  the  rubric  of  the  criminal”  (124)  while  an
earlier  essay  characterizes  both  Du  Bois’  and  Chandler’s  retorts  to  European
philosophical traditions as processes of “aeration,” or “digging and tilling” (38). The
relationship between the readings and re-readings of Du Bois through both Chandler
and Moten, however, is more like “the loving care of thoughtful, abrasive caress” or, in
an acknowledgment of the aim to uncover as yet unrecognised novelty, a process akin
to “ex-foliation” (39). It is worth paying attention to these stylistic choices because they
encapsulate a central feature of Moten’s writing, namely the analytic enmeshment of
his own arguments with those of the figures he has chosen as his companions in the
ongoing effort to identify and theorise black radical practices. 
6 Almost a third of Stolen Life is taken up by an expanded version of a 2004 essay entitled
“Knowledge of Freedom” which was originally published in The New Centennial Review
and is, in the broadest terms, an effort to read towards a theory of what Moten calls the
black Kant. “Knowledge of Freedom” builds on the work of German literary critic and
philosopher  Winfried  Menninghaus’  In  Praise  of  Nonsense  (Lob  des  Unsinns) which
interrogates  Kant’s  claim  in  the  Critique  of  Judgement that  “all  the  richness  of  the
imagination…in its lawless freedom produces nothing but nonsense” (1).  For Moten,
who describes the encounter with Menninghaus’ work as “a kind of rebeginning” (269),
Kant’s  insistence  that  the  imagination  be  controlled,  policed,  and  managed  also
contains  a  latent  acknowledgment of  the anarchic  potential  that  lurks  beneath the
Kantian  category  of  Einbildungskraft.  “Knowledge  of  Freedom”  participates  in  a
parallel effort to the recent writings of David Lloyd whose Under Representation takes as
its object the racial  analytic tenets of aesthetic theory. Where Lloyd, who has most
recently engaged with Moten’s work in a review of the consent not to be a single being
trilogy, is particularly interested in uncovering the hierarchies contained within claims
to  aesthetic  universality,  Moten  is  engaged  in  a  counter-reading  with  the  goal  of
tentative  but  nonetheless  transformative  recovery.  Kant  here  is  no  longer  the
philosopher  who  claimed  that  Black  people  lack  the  capacity  for  true  aesthetic
sensibility  but  a  thinker  who  recognized  and  named  the  disruptive  potential  of
Blackness  through  his  repeated  insistence  that  it  be  restrained.  The  German
philosopher  therefore  recognized  the  possibility  of  unbridled  imagination  and,  by
extension, freedom. In Moten’s words, Kant’s nonsense, like Blackness, “is a fugitive
presence” (1). Through this association Moten identifies a politics of black flight within
the tradition of aesthetic theory. The comparison between nonsensical Phantasie and
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Blackness percolates around the remaining thirteen chapters of Stolen Life and serves as
the foundation of Moten’s own theory of aesthetics and politics. After all,  how does
freedom  appear  in  the  lives  and  aesthetic  practices  of  Black  people  who  were
consistently barred from accessing this marker of political subjecthood? And, if such
freedom is indeed a fugitive presence, what are the implications for the study of Black
political and aesthetic practices? 
7 These questions reverberate around the remainder of Stolen Life propelling the author
into a number of locales in the search for expressions of fugitive freedom. In the first
essay  alone,  Moten  travels  from  the  German  Enlightenment  to  the  life  of  Olaudah
Equiano  and  then  into  our  more  recent  past  through  the  literary  networks  of
circulation  and  trade  that  proliferate  in  Nigeria’s  Onitsha  market.  In  many  ways
“Knowledge of Freedom” acts as the overture of a vast philosophical treatise in which a
set  of  recurring  themes  and  questions  regarding  the  sphere  of  the  political  are
introduced but certainly not resolved. In “The New International of Decent Feelings,”
Moten confronts  expectations  of  unquestioning affective  patriotism during the U.S.
War on Terror and in “Here, There, and Everywhere” he discusses at length academic
debates over the BDS Movement. A short and painful chapter entitled “Rilya Wilson.
Precious  Doe.  Buried  Angel”  dwells  on  images  of  three  children–  two  Black  and
American,  one  Palestinian –  who all  died  as  a  result  of  state  violence.  Though the
opening sentences of the chapter see Moten equivocating on the demand for “a specific
and necessary solidarity between the people of [the black radical] tradition and the
Palestinian people” (152), the choice to consider these children’s fates alongside each
other  as  victims  of  U.S.  imperialism  in  part  acknowledges  the  necessity  of  such  a
political  project.  Like  all  of  Stolen  Life’s chapters  this  one  too  does  not  offer  any
conclusions or solutions.  Instead,  Moten insists that the readings he has performed
contain  “the  call  for  an  extension  of  the  terrible  and  beautiful  project  of  radical
imagining, of radical imaging, of radical poesis and radical remembering” (154). Such
statements are those of a thinker with a precise awareness of history who recognizes
the centrality of internationalism to the black radical tradition. If  Stolen Life can be
categorized as a work of political theory, it is still political theory in the style of Fred
Moten. An essay like “Air Shaft, Rent Party” contains the “certain devotional and club-
like buzz” (xii) that the author promises in Stolen Life’s preface. 
8 As is  the case  with his  prior  works,  Stolen  Life demonstrates  Moten’s  extraordinary
generosity as a reader and critic. At times, this generosity is extended to figures who
may not be entirely deserving of such close critical  attention (as Mimi Howard has
noted, Avital Ronell makes a surprise appearance in a later chapter which concludes on
an uncomfortably admiring note). But Stolen Life also exhibits Moten’s willingness to
dissemble arguments that he deems politically indefensible or lacking in precision. In
“Gestural  Critique  of  Judgement,”  Moten  takes  aim  at  film  studies  scholar  Linda
Williams’ reading of a now iconic scene which took place during the OJ Simpson trial.
For  Williams,  the  moment  in  which  a  black  juror  raised  his  fist  while  leaving  the
courtroom  is  indicative  of  the  juror’s  understanding  of  law  and  politics  as  “racial
melodrama.” For Moten, this same scene is a gestural enactment of unruly freedom.
More  importantly,  Williams’  misreading  of  the  juror’s  raised  fist  reveals  an
unwillingness  on  the  part  of  professionalised  scholars  to  read  Black  gestures  of
freedom on their own terms and as politics. Moments like these serve as a reminder of
professionalized scholarship’s limitations when it comes to working with histories of
fugitive freedom. As much as the constraint of the classroom pushes scholars of the
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black radical tradition to search for possibilities of flight, those same spaces can also
produce a sense of inertia and complacency in those who have limited stakes in Black
studies.  Though  the  achievements  of  Stolen  Life reach  far  beyond  what  can  be
summarized in this review, Moten’s writing here also provides an urgent reminder:
black radical practices flourish in spite of the demands of professionalized scholarship
and not because of them. 
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